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In intergroup conflict, self-sacrifice
is stronger among pro-social
individuals, and parochial altruism
emerges especially among
cognitively taxed individuals
Carsten K. W. De Dreu1,2*, D. Berno Dussel1 and Femke S. Ten Velden1
1 Department of Psychology, University of Amsterdam, Amsterdam, Netherlands, 2 Center for Experimental Economics and
Political Decision Making, University of Amsterdam, Amsterdam, Netherlands
Parochial altruism is decomposed in a tendency to benefit the in-group along with a
tendency to ignore, derogate, and harm rivaling out-groups. Building off recent work
suggesting that decisions to cooperate can be relatively fast and intuitive, we examine
parochial altruism in intergroup conflict when cognitive deliberation is rendered difficult or
not. Predictions were tested in an experiment using an incentivized Intergroup Prisoner’s
Dilemma–Maximizing Differences Game with 95 subjects classified as either pro-social
or pro-self being randomly allocated to high vs. low impulse-control conditions. Results
showed, first of all, that self-sacrificial decisions to contribute were made faster than
decisions not to contribute, and that faster decision time associated with more positive
expectations of in-group members. Second, we observed that lowering impulse control
with a difficult rather than easy Stroop Task increased the amount contributed to a
pool that benefited in-group members while harming out-group members; thus reducing
deliberation increased parochial altruism. Finally, results replicated earlier work showing
that especially pro-social (vs. pro-self) individuals contributed more to the in-group and
did not lower their contributions to the between-group pool that benefitted their in-
group and, simultaneously, hurt the out-group. This pattern emerged independent of
their impulse control. Thus, (in-group bounded) cooperation is more prominent among
individuals with strong rather than weak other-regarding preferences. Moreover, the
intuitive tendency to cooperate may have evolved in the context of intergroup conflict
and therefore is sharp-edged—in-group bounded and including willingness to aggress
out-groups.
Keywords: intergroup conflict, competition, parochial altruism, dual systems, ego depletion
Introduction
Humans owe much of their evolutionary success to their strong capacity to create and maintain
cohesive groups within which they engage in complex forms of cooperative exchange, negotiate,
and trade, innovate, and disseminate knowledge, insights, values, and preferences (Darwin, 1871;
Bowles and Gintis, 2004, 2011; Henrich and Henrich, 2007; Wilson, 2012; De Dreu et al., 2014a).
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In fact, being included in strong, well-functioning, and innovative
groups provides ﬁtness functionality to its individual members
because they are more likely to survive, prosper, and reproduce
than individuals living in groups where most members lack such
cooperative inclinations: “. . .groups with a greater number of
courageous, sympathetic, and faithful members, who were always
ready to warn each other of danger, to aid and defend each other
. . .would spread and be victorious over other tribes” (Darwin,
1871, p. 156).
Because of the group’s functionality to individual ﬁtness,
humans may have evolved a “group psychology” that includes
a propensity to (i) identify with groups and its members, (ii)
empathize with the needs and interests of fellow group mem-
bers, (iii) self-sacriﬁce, trust, and cooperate with other group
members, and (iv) loyally commit and contribute to the func-
tioning of one’s group (De Dreu et al., 2014a; De Dreu and Kret,
2015). Furthermore, because groups exist next to other groups
with whom they cooperate, compare, and compete, group eﬃ-
ciency often is relative – groups that generate greater surplus than
other groups become relatively strong and prosperous, achieve
a relatively favorable social status position, and may be better
able to exert power and inﬂuence over other groups and their
members (De Dreu et al., 2014a). Accordingly, the evolved group
psychology must be, at least to some extent, relative and com-
parative vis-à-vis other groups. Throughout evolution humans
may have become prepared to self-sacriﬁce in order to coop-
erate with others, but especially with those they rely upon, are
interdependent with, and expect interactions with in the future,
that is, with those others that are perceived to be part of one’s
group (Balliet et al., 2014). Some even proposed that such in-
group bounded cooperation may have co-evolved with tenden-
cies to aggress against rivaling out-groups (LeVine and Campbell,
1972; Campbell, 1975; Bernhard et al., 2006; Bowles, 2009; De
Dreu et al., 2014a). After all, when group eﬃciency is relative,
promoting in-group eﬃciency, or undermining out-group eﬃ-
ciency are two means toward the same end (De Dreu et al.,
2014a).
The possibility that self-sacriﬁcial in-group cooperation and
out-group aggression co-evolved (henceforth parochial altru-
ism; Bowles, 2009) ﬁts extant work showing that intergroup
competition motivates individuals to make costly contributions
to their in-group (e.g., Manson and Wrangham, 1991; Erev
et al., 1993; Bornstein and Ben-Yossef, 1994; Bornstein et al.,
2002; Bornstein, 2003; Bornstein and Gilula, 2003; Wildschut
et al., 2003; Reeve and Holldobler, 2007; Abbink et al., 2012;
Bohm and Rockenbach, 2013). It also is key in evolutionary
models such as group selection and gene-culture co-evolution
theory that argue that parochial altruism evolved because of
impactful hostile intergroup encounters throughout human
evolutionary history (Boyd and Richerson, 1982; Alexander,
1990; Choi and Bowles, 2007; Eﬀerson et al., 2008; Bowles,
2009).
If such evolutionary perspectives on parochial altruism hold,
individual propensity for parochial altruism may be sustained
by evolutionary ancient neural circuitries involved in aﬀective
responding and intuitive decision making. Indeed, there is some
work showing that cooperation and trust rests, in part, on
sub-cortical neural circuitries recruited for aﬀective and intu-
itive rather than deliberative, controlled decision making (Rilling
and Sanfey, 2011). For example, parochial altruism is mod-
ulated by hypothalamic oxytocin that acts on the amygdala-
hippocampal circuitries more than on prefrontal brain areas
involved in impulse-control and deliberation (De Dreu et al.,
2010, 2012, 2014b; Baumgartner et al., 2014; Carter, 2014; De
Dreu and Kret, 2015; Ma et al., 2015). Neuro-imaging stud-
ies of individual tendencies to discriminate between in-group
and out-group conﬁrm that both categorization of self and oth-
ers into in- and out-groups as well discriminatory preferences
for the in-group over the out-group are fast and modulated by
sub-cortical brain structures disconnected from executive control
and cognitive monitoring (Hein et al., 2010; Baumgartner et al.,
2014; Cikarna and Van Bavel, 2014; Kret et al., 2015). In addi-
tion to this, there is some evidence to suggest that cooperation
in general, and parochial altruism in particular, may be fast and
intuitive, rather than deliberated. From studies on public goods
provision we know that cooperative individuals decided more
quickly than those who withheld cooperation, and that individ-
uals in which an intuitive mindset was primed cooperated more
than those in which a deliberation mindset was activated (Rand
et al., 2012). Moreover, demotivating and/or disabling delibera-
tion by having participants perform a cognitively taxing Stroop
task prior to decision making, ampliﬁed both spiteful rejection of
other’s unfairness and benign reciprocation of trust (Halali et al.,
2013).
Our ﬁrst goal here was to examine the possibility that, con-
sistent with the above works, self-sacriﬁce is fast and intuitive,
rather than deliberated and calculative. Prior to decision mak-
ing, participants performed a diﬃcult and cognitively taxing (vs.
easy) Stroop Task (Stroop, 1935). There is good evidence that
performing a cognitively taxing task prior to decision making
reduces the ability and/or motivation to exert cognitive con-
trol (Muraven et al., 2006; Baumeister and Vohs, 2007; Inzlicht
and Schmeichel, 2012). Both possibilities suggest that follow-
ing a cognitively taxing task, decision making becomes more
impulsive, and intuitive (Hagger et al., 2010). Accordingly, we
expected (i) more parochial altruism when decision making is
intuitive, and (ii) faster decisions to be associated with more
self-sacriﬁce.
We pursued two additional goals. First, the work on parochial
altruism allows for the possibility that individuals self-sacriﬁce
to serve the in-group (Brewer, 1999; Halevy et al., 2008), or to
hurt the out-group (Brewer, 1999), or to simultaneously serve
the in-group and hurt the out-group. Speciﬁcally, earlier work
using experimental games, such as the intergroup prisoner’s
dilemma (Bornstein, 2003), showed that intergroup competi-
tion motivates individuals to extend cooperation toward their
in-group, yet such cooperation not only beneﬁtted their in-
group but also, at the same time, hurt the out-group (Halevy
et al., 2008). Halevy et al. (2008) designed a Intergroup Prisoner’s
Dilemma-Maximizing Diﬀerences (IPD–MD) game to exam-
ine whether such simultaneously beneﬁtting the in-group and
hurting the out-group, in fact, primarily reﬂects a desire to
serve the in-group, and their results indeed supported such
a proposition—in intergroup settings, individuals contributed
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more to a within-group pool that beneﬁtted their in-group, than
to a between-group pool that beneﬁtted their in-group and simul-
taneously hurt their out-group. This result ﬁts the outcomes of
a recent meta-analysis (Balliet et al., 2014), along with a grow-
ing body of primary studies (Halevy et al., 2008, 2010, 2012;
De Dreu, 2010; De Dreu et al., 2010; Buttelmann and Böhm,
2014) that in intergroup settings individuals are motivated more
by a desire to beneﬁt the in-group than by a desire to hurt the
out-group.
Using the experimental set-up designed by Halevy et al.
(2008), we explored whether cognitive taxation increases con-
tributions to the within-group pool, or whether it increases
parochial altruism (the between-group pool). Second, we exam-
ined whether parochial altruism is stronger among individuals
who value fairness and cooperation (henceforth “pro-socials,”
Van Lange, 1999), compared to those who value personal out-
comes, and relative gain (henceforth “pro-selfs”). While evo-
lutionary perspectives on parochial altruism are silent about
the possibility that individual diﬀerences in value orientation
impacts parochial altruism, several studies indicate that in
intergroup competition, pro-social individuals display stronger
parochial altruism, and a desire to beneﬁt the in-group in par-
ticular, than pro-selfs (De Dreu, 2010; De Dreu et al., 2010;
Abbink et al., 2012; Aaldering et al., 2013). We expected to
replicate this ﬁnding, and explored whether cognitive taxa-
tion interacts with social value orientation in driving parochial
altruism.
Materials and Methods
Participants, Ethics, and Experimental
Design
Participants were recruited through the web-portal of the
Psychology Research Institute of the University of Amsterdam.
Based on our earlier work (De Dreu, 2010; De Dreu et al.,
2010) we set a required sample size of 100, and recruited a total
N = 111 (35 males and 76 females; Mage = 21.44, SD = 2.66)
to participate in a study on human decision making. Participants
received a €7 show-up fee, and the possibility to earn extra
money through decision making (actual extra earnings were
M = €5.75, range €0–€15). The study was approved by the
Psychology Ethics Committee (ﬁle number 2012-WOP-2501),
and participants provided written informed consent prior to the
study. They were paid and debriefed upon completion of the
study.
The design involved a 2 (Cognitive Taxation: Yes/No) × 2
(Social Value Orientation: Pro-social/Pro-self) between-subjects
design. Participants were randomly assigned to the ﬁrst factor;
social value orientation was a post hoc blocking factor. Dependent
variables were the time taken to decide (log-transformed), self-
sacriﬁce (money contributed) as well as its decomposition in
within-group and between-group contribution (the latter count-
ing as parochial altruism). A post-experimental questionnaire
assessed expectations that in-group members contributed to the
within-group pool and the adequacy of the cognitive taxation
manipulation.
Procedure and Measures
Experimental sessions involved groups of six individual partic-
ipants. Upon arrival in the laboratory, participants were seated
in individual cubicles that prevented them from seeing or hear-
ing others. The experimenter unlocked the computer, and left.
From that point onward, the experiment was computer-guided.
Figure 1 gives a schematic representation of the experimental
tasks and time-lines. As can be seen, participants ﬁrst completed
a measure to assess their social value orientation, then performed
a series of ﬁller tests that contained no experimental manipu-
lations, received instructions for the IPD–MD and performed
a more or less cognitively taxing Stroop task to manipulate
cognitive taxation. Then they made decisions in the IPD–MD,
responded to a short questionnaire, and were debriefed and
dismissed.
To assess social value orientation, we used a standard decom-
posed triple dominance measure that is widely used and well-
validated (Van Lange and Kuhlman, 1994; De Dreu and Van
Lange, 1995; Van Lange, 1999; Aaldering et al., 2013; also see
Murphy and Ackermann, 2014). In each of nine decomposed
games, subjects could choose from three diﬀerent distributions
of points to themselves and another person that they did not
know and would not meet. An example is the decision between
Option 1 [560 to You; 300 to Other], Option 2 [500 to You;
100 to Other], and Option 3 [500 to You; 500 to Other]).
Option 1 reﬂects individualism because one’s own outcomes
(560) exceed those in Option 2 (500) or Option 3 (500). Option
2 reﬂects competition, because it provides a greater advantage
over the other’s outcomes (500 − 100 = 400) than Option
1 (560 − 300 = 260) or Option 3 (500 − 500 = 0), and
Option 3 reﬂects a pro-social orientation because it provides a
larger joint outcome (500 + 500 = 1000) than either Option
1 (560 + 300 = 860) or Option 2 (500 + 100 = 600). To be
classiﬁed as pro-social (pro-self) participants had to choose con-
sistently in at least six of the nine games. Ninety-ﬁve subjects
were classiﬁed as pro-social (N = 45) or pro-self (N = 50; 45
were individualistic, and ﬁve were consistently competitive). The
remaining subjects were unclassiﬁable and dropped from the
analyses.
Following the decomposed game measure, subjects contin-
ued with a series of unrelated ﬁller-tasks (surveys about atti-
tudes regarding various health issues) to create a gap between
the measurement of social values and the IPD–MD (Halevy
et al., 2008) we used to study parochial altruism. After 25 min,
the computer ended the ﬁller-tasks and introduced the IPD–
MD (Halevy et al., 2008, 2010, 2012; De Dreu, 2010). Subjects
were told that they would make decisions involving the par-
ticipant’s own group (denoted as “Team C2”), and another
three-person group (denoted as “Team H5”; labeling was coun-
terbalanced but never had eﬀects and is further ignored).
Participants were informed that groups were composed on the
basis of the order in which they had signed up for the exper-
iment, and that most, but not necessarily all, group mem-
bers were currently present in the laboratory. They were also
told that they would not know who was in their group or
who was in the other group (Halevy et al., 2008; De Dreu,
2010).
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FIGURE 1 | Overview of experimental procedures and timeline.
Following assessment of (1) social value orientation using nine decomposed
games, subjects (2) completed irrelevant filler-tasks, were (3) organized in
two three-person groups and explained the IPD–MD, before they (4)
performed either a high or low taxing Stroop Interference Task to tax
cognitive resources or not, and then (5) made five IPD–MD decisions, (6)
indicated their in-group expectations, and finished with cognitive-taxation
measures. Coloring is for illustrative purposes only.
Hereafter, computer instructions stated that for group deci-
sion making, each individual group member would receive an
endowment of €10, which was in addition to individuals’ par-
ticipation fee. Next, we explained that each Euro kept was
worth €1 for the individual; each Euro that was contributed to
the within-group pool added €0.50 to each in-group member
including the contributor; each Euro that was contributed to
the between-group pool added €0.50 to each in-group member
including the contributor and, in addition, also subtracted €0.50
from each out-group member. The amount contributed to the
within-group pool reﬂects “in-group cooperation,” the amount
contributed to the between-group pool reﬂects parochial altru-
ism (or “out-group hate” per Halevy et al., 2008). The instructions
were in neutral language and there was no mention of the words
cooperation or competition. Participants were assured that their
decisions would remain completely conﬁdential, and solved a
quiz that tested their understanding of the rules of the game
[i.e., we provided a series of possible group-level investments
(e.g., you keep three, invest ﬁve in the within-group pool, and
invest two in the between-group pool; all other members of
your Team, and those of the other Team keep their endow-
ments and make no investment: how much do you receive? How
much does another member of your Team receive?)]. Analyses
of their responses showed that all subjects understood the
game.
Following the IPD–MD instructions, participants were given a
short task intended to lower cognitive control and increase intu-
itive decision making. The task was modeled after the Stroop
Interference Task (SIT; Stroop, 1935; Hagger et al., 2010; Halali
et al., 2013, 2014). Subjects were shown a color word on their
screen (e.g., “blue”) that was written in a particular color (e.g.,
blue) and had to indicate as fast and accurately as possible what
the color of the word was. In the high taxing condition, we
provided thirty-six inconsistent stimuli (i.e., color words writ-
ten in a diﬀerent color, e.g., “blue” written in red). Studies have
shown that responding to inconsistent stimuli is cognitive taxing
and reduces the ability and motivation to engage executive and
impulse-control (Stroop, 1935; Hagger et al., 2010). Two subjects
in this condition indicated they were color-blind and dropped
from the analyses (as they were also unclassiﬁable regarding their
social value orientation, this did not further reduce our ﬁnal sam-
ple size). In the low-taxing condition, we provided 36 consistent
stimuli (i.e., color words written in the same color, e.g., “blue”
written in blue).
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Immediately following the low or high taxing SIT, partic-
ipants were asked to indicate how much of their €10 they
contributed to the within-group pool, how much they con-
tributed to the between-group pool, and how much they kept
for themselves. Participants were asked to make their alloca-
tion decision ﬁve times and told that one of these decisions
would be randomly drawn for payout. Participants knew that
no feedback about others’ choices would be given. Investment
decisions were averaged across the ﬁve rounds (α = 0.93
for within-group investments; α = 0.94 for between-group
investments; rwithin−between = −0.396, p = 0.001). In addi-
tion to recording investments, we measured time in seconds
taken to decide how much participants kept to themselves
(i.e., the reverse of self-sacriﬁce; α = 0.88). Decision time
was log-transformed to meet the requirements for parametric
testing (analyses using the observed data permitted the same
conclusions).
Following IPD–MD investments we measured in-group
expectations by asking subjects to indicate the extent to which
they expected fellow in-group members to contribute to the
within-group pool (1 = not at all; 7 = very much). To verify
the eﬀectiveness of the cognitive-taxation manipulation, partic-
ipants were given an (unknowingly) unsolvable anagram which
they were asked to solve. Time was unlimited and at subjects’ dis-
cretion, and we assessed how much time they persisted on this
task. Then participants indicated how alert and concentrated they
felt (both 1 = not at all, to 5 = very much; r = 0.421, p < 0.01).
This completed the experiment.
Results
Manipulation Checks
Participants given the high taxing SIT gave up earlier
on trying to solve an (unknowingly) unsolvable ana-
gram [MSIThightaxing = 46.94 s vs. MSITlowtaxing = 72.60 s,
F(1,91) = 11.19, p = 0.001]. They also felt less alert and concen-
trated [combined MSIThightaxing = 2.47 vs. MSITlowtaxing = 2.95,
F(1,91)= 5.483, p= 0.021]. From these results, we conclude that
those given the high taxing SIT had lowered cognitive control
than those given the low taxing SIT.
Decision Making
Consistent with the possibility that self-sacriﬁce is intuitive, self-
reported alertness and concentration was positively correlated
with the amount participants kept for themselves, r(95) = 0.231,
p = 0.024. Furthermore, Figure 2A shows that the time it took
subjects to decide how much to keep to themselves positively
predicted how much they kept to themselves, r(95) = 0.272,
p = 0.008. Decision time was negatively related to within-group
contributions, r(95) = −0.220, p = 0.033, and unrelated to
parochial altruism, r(95) = −0.067, p = 0.51. Finally, Figure 2B
shows that time to ponder how much to keep was negatively
related to in-group expectations, r(95) = −0.185, p = 0.078
(marginal). These results are consistent with the idea that selﬁsh
behavior is deliberated whereas self-sacriﬁce and assessments of
in-group members’ cooperation are relatively fast and intuitive.
Intergroup Prisoner’s Dilemma–Maximizing Diﬀerences
Game investments were averaged and analyzed in a 2 (Yes/No
cognitive taxing SIT) × 2 (pro-social/pro-self) × 3 (pool:
self/within-group/between-group) mixed-model ANOVA with
pool within-subjects. A strong main eﬀect for Pool showed, ﬁrst
of all, that self-sacriﬁce manifested in within-group contribu-
tions more than in between-group contributions, M = 4.304
vs. M = 2.11, F(1,91) = 25.77, p = 0.0001. This eﬀect was
qualiﬁed by an interaction between cognitive taxation and pool,
F(2,90) = 4.59, p = 0.013. Figure 3A shows that parochial altru-
ism was stronger among high taxed (vs. low taxed) individuals,
F(1,91) = 7.08, p = 0.009. Interestingly, compared to low taxed
individuals, those in the high taxing condition allocated about
equally to the within-group pool, F(1,91) = 1.01, p = 0.32, and
more to the between-group pool, F(1,91) = 4.81, p = 0.031.
Together these results suggest that lowered cognitive control
following taxation increases contributions to the between-group
pool, and this ﬁts the idea that parochial altruism is more
intuitive than deliberated.
Cognitive taxation did not interact with social value orienta-
tion in inﬂuencing contributions, Fs < 1.9. However, consistent
with earlier work, we observed a pool × social value orientation
interaction, F(2,90) = 3.573, p = 0.032: pro-socials kept less to
themselves, F(1,91) = 4.20, p = 0.043, contributed more to the
within-group pool, F(1,91) = 7.29, p = 0.008, and equally to
the between-group pool as pro-selves, F(1,91) = 1.19, p = 0.278
(Figure 3B). Both pro-selves and pro-socials contributed more
than nothing to the between-group pool, t(44)= 6.315, p= 0.001,
and t(49) = 6.833, p = 0.001. Together these results show that
whereas pro-selves are non-cooperative toward their in-group,
pro-socials beneﬁt their in-group. Both pro-socials and pro-
selves maintain a certain level of parochial altruism regardless of
whether or not they are cognitively taxed.
The above analyses leave open the possibility that some partic-
ipants invested exclusively in the within-group pool (and could
thus be described as in-group bounded cooperators as well as
universal cooperators), whereas others invested exclusively in
the between-group pool (and thus are strict parochial altruists).
To investigate this possibility, we classiﬁed subjects into distinct
types: those who kept their entire endowment (selﬁsh types),
those who contributed exclusively to the within-group pool (in-
group cooperators), those who contributed to both the within-
and between-group pool (ambivalent parochial altruists), and
those who contributed exclusively to the between-group pool
(strict parochial altruists). Table 1 shows the breakdown of types
by cognitive taxation, with the 4 × 2 interaction being, χ2(3,
N = 95) = 7.115, p = 0.068. As can be seen, very few par-
ticipants never (across ﬁve investment decisions) contributed
anything (selﬁsh types) and very few contributed exclusively to
the between-group pool (strict parochial altruists). Across the ﬁve
investment decisions, most participants did invest (>0) in either
the within-group pool (in-group cooperators) or in both the
within-group and the between-group pool (ambivalent parochial
altruists). As can be seen also, especially ambivalent parochial
altruists emerge under cognitive taxation. This resonates with the
above analysis showing that cognitive taxation boosts parochial
altruism. It suggests that such a boost is not a reﬂection of a
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FIGURE 2 | Longer time used when deciding how much to keep to
oneself (in seconds, log-transformed) associates with more selfish
decision-making and less positive expectations of in-group members.
(A) Time (log-transformed seconds) taken to decide how much to keep
positively relates to contribution to self. (B) Time (log-transformed seconds)
taken to decide how much to keep negatively relates to in-group expectations.
FIGURE 3 | Averaged Intergroup Prisoner’s Dilemma–Maximizing
Differences Game (IPD–MD) contributions to self, within-group pool,
and between-group pool (parochial altruism; range 0–10; means
displayed ±1 SE). (A) Compared to individuals in the low taxing condition
(N = 46), individuals in the high taxing condition (N = 49) self-sacrifice, and
display parochial altruism. (B) Compared to pro-selves (N = 50), pro-social
individuals (N = 45) self-sacrifice, contribute more to the within-group pool, and
display similar levels of parochial altruism.
TABLE 1 | Contributor types broken down by cognitive taxation.
Contributor type
Cognitive
taxation
Selfish In-group
cooperator
Ambivalent
parochial
altruists
Strict
parochial
altruists
Yes (N = 49)
No (N = 46)
1 (2%)
3 (7%)
12 (24%)
16 (35%)
35 (71%)
22 (48%)
1 (2%)
5 (10%)
Entries are observed number of subjects (row-based percentages in brackets).
Selfish types keep their endowment; In-group cooperators contributed (>0) exclu-
sively to the within-group pool; ambivalent aarochial altruists contributed (>0)
to both the within- and between-group pool; strict parochial altruists exclusively
contributed (>0) to the between-group pool.
shift toward strict parochial altruism, but instead a muddying of
cooperation with the in-group and aggression toward the rival
out-group.
We also examined the break-down of types by social value
orientation, which was not signiﬁcant, χ2(3, N = 95) = 4.848,
p = 0.183. Among pro-social (pro-self) individuals, 27% (32%)
were in-group cooperators, and 56% (64%) were ambivalent
parochial altruists. This suggests that the above ﬁndings for
social value orientation reﬂect the strength of motivation—the
extent to which people decide to contribute—rather than its strict
directionality.
In-Group Expectations
Expectations of in-group members contributions to the within-
group pool was positively related to self-sacriﬁce, r(95) = 0.445,
p = 0.001, especially to contributions to the within-group
pool, r(95) = 0.469, p = 0.001, and not to contributions
to the between-group pool, r(95) = −0.043, p = 0.677).
A 2(Yes/No cognitively taxing SIT) × 2(pro-social/pro-self)
between-subjects ANOVA on in-group expectations showed less
positive expectations among individuals in the high cognitive tax-
ing condition (M= 4.809) compared to those in the low cognitive
taxing condition (M = 4.267), F(1,91) = 4.32, p = 0.040. Pro-
social individuals also displayed (somewhat) more positive expec-
tations (M = 4.753) than pro-selves (M = 4.211), F(1,91)= 2.86,
p = 0.094. The cognitive taxation × social value interaction
was not signiﬁcant, F(1,91) = 0.73, p = 0.395. In short, cog-
nitively taxed individuals, and to a lesser extent those with a
pro-social value orientation, had more positive expectations of
their in-group members.
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Discussion and Conclusion
Human cooperation and self-sacriﬁce may emerge partly
because it provides survival beneﬁts in intergroup competi-
tion and, therefore, often is in-group bounded and parochial
(Bornstein, 2003; De Dreu et al., 2014a). Heretofore unan-
swered was whether such self-sacriﬁce in intergroup compe-
tition was a deliberated, calculated response to pressing con-
ﬂicts between personal and group interests or, instead, a rela-
tively automatic and intuitive decision. Present ﬁndings align
with the latter possibility—whereas selﬁshness appeared to be
the slower and thus more deliberated response, self-sacriﬁce
appeared to be fast and thus more intuitive. Indeed, self-
sacriﬁcial contributions were released when individual’s cog-
nitive control was taxed. This resonates with recent work in
neurobiology and cognitive psychology (Kosfeld et al., 2005;
De Dreu et al., 2010, 2012; Rand et al., 2012; Van Honk
et al., 2012) and supports the conjecture that cooperation is
oftentimes intuitive, in-group-bounded, and potentially sharp-
edged.
Current ﬁndings inform neo-classical rational choice theo-
ries that view humans to be motivated to maximize personal,
short-term gain. Our results, and those of others (Rand et al.,
2012; Halali et al., 2013, 2014), support the idea that human
cooperation is intuitive rather than calculated. Furthermore,
the conjecture that cooperation is primarily geared at beneﬁt-
ing one’s in-group while simultaneously hurting the out-group
ﬁts evidence that brain circuitries involved in empathy and
other-concern operate much stronger when targets are clas-
siﬁed as in-group rather than out-group (Harris and Fiske,
2006; Hein et al., 2010; Cikara et al., 2011; Baumgartner et al.,
2012).
We studied intuitive cooperation in the presence of an
out-group that was enabled to hurt the in-group. Collective
action oftentimes takes place in absence of rivaling out-
groups, in which case in-group boundedness and universal-
ism as foci of self-sacriﬁce cannot be separated (Wit and
Kerr, 2002; De Dreu and Balliet, 2015). Perhaps, the default,
intuitive response in social dilemmas is to cooperate, with
such cooperation becoming parochial when out-group com-
petition is present. Perhaps, however, the default, intuitive
response is to serve one’s in-group, which translates into uni-
versalism when no other option to serve one’s in-group is
available (Burton-Chellew and West, 2012; also see De Dreu
and Balliet, 2015). We call for new research mapping situa-
tions ranging from inter-group competition being fully absent
to being strongly present, to further understand when and
why human cooperation evolved into an automated, intu-
itive response that is released rather than blocked by impeded
impulse-control.
The impulse to beneﬁt one’s in-group was triggered here
by a simple task known to undermine executive functioning
(Stroop, 1935). We note that because of time constraints, multi-
ple tasks awaiting attention, ambient noise, and social pressures,
the human capacity to deliberate and to think deeply before act-
ing is constantly challenged (Kruglanski et al., 2006; De Dreu
et al., 2008). However, it is important to note that questions have
been raised about depletion as a manipulation of intuitive vs.
deliberativeness. For example, looking at altruism in the Dictator
Game, depletion typically reduces altruism (Balliet and Joireman,
2010; Xu et al., 2012; Halali et al., 2013), whereas cognitive load
(which is a direct manipulation of cognitive resources) typically
increases altruism (Roch et al., 2000; Cornelissen et al., 2011;
Schulz et al., 2014). A recent study by Rand et al. (2014) relates
to the current ﬁndings, in that they also examined how deci-
sion making constraints—time pressure during decision making
in their case, compared to cognitive taxation prior decision mak-
ing in the current study—inﬂuenced cooperation in intergroup
settings. Experiment 1 involved a two-person prisoner’s dilem-
mas between a participant and an antagonist said to either prefer
the same presidential candidate (e.g., Obama), or the oppos-
ing candidate (e.g., Romney). Results showed that time pressure
facilitated cooperation, and that people cooperated more with
someone that preferred the same presidential candidate, rather
than the opposing candidate; no interaction among time pressure
and antagonist’s political preference was observed. Our ﬁnding
that cognitive taxation increases contributions not only ﬁts this,
but also clariﬁes that increased cooperation with someone shar-
ing the same political preference is motivated by a desire to
beneﬁt the in-group more than a desire to hurt the out-group
(also see Balliet et al., 2014). This convergence notwithstand-
ing, new research using a diﬀerent manipulation is required to
conclusively settle whether time constraints and cognitive tax-
ation impact cooperation because of their shared impact on
intuitive versus more deliberated decision making. Such new
research should include sophisticated measures also of deple-
tion and impulse-control, akin to the measures used here that
showed that the cognitive taxing manipulation not only aﬀected
self-sacriﬁce and parochial altruism, but also decision time, post-
decision making task-persistence, and self-reported fatigue and
alertness.
Current ﬁndings suggest that cognitively challenging con-
texts lower self-control and facilitate rather than impede coop-
eration and collective action. Such cognitively challenging set-
tings can also trigger negative behaviors toward rival out-
groups. Displays of parochial altruism not only increase in-
group status relative to the out-group but also negative emotions
and aggressive responses among maltreated out-group mem-
bers (Dovidio and Gaertner, 2010; De Dreu et al., 2014b).
Ironically, then, whereas humans may have the evolved intu-
ition to cooperate, it is unlikely such intuition brings world peace
closer.
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